Bey cites laws and principles that have no bearing on the criminal proceedings currently before the court. The court finds that “the legal position taken [in this case] is necessarily deficient” because “all of the provisions of the Treaty with Morocco are [] wholly inapposite” to the challenge currently before the court. Bey v. Hillside Twp. Mun. Court, 2012 WL 714575, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012).[1]
US v. Smalls, Dist. Court, D. South Carolina 2018
Fatal to petitioner’s assertion of immunity is the non-recognition of the Moorish Nation as a sovereign state by the United States. See Benton-El v. Odom, 2007 WL 1812615, at 6 (M.D.Ga. June 19, 2007); Osiris v. Brown, 2005 WL 2044904, at 2 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2005); Khattab El v. United States Justice Dept., 1988 WL 5117, at 2 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 22, 1988: see also, We the People Beys and Els v. State of New York, 165 F.3d 16, 1998 WL 801875, at 1 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1998) (unpublished opinion). Petitioner cannot unilaterally bestow sovereign immunity upon himself. See United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1984). Petitioner’s purported status as a Moorish-American citizen does not enable him to violate state and federal laws without consequence.
Irvin v. Hendrix, Dist. Court, ED Arkansas 2018
Moreover, as noted, a federal court may dismiss claims that are based on indisputably meritless legal theories and/or founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28. All of Petitioner’s Moorish National identity claims have been found by federal courts to be based on indisputably meritless legal theories and/or founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions.[3] Thus, it is not the case that federal courts have refused to “inquire into” those claims. See id.
Brown-Bey v. Hooks, Dist. Court, WD North Carolina 2018
Plaintiff inaccurately refers to South Carolina as a foreign nation. Based on a frivolous “Moorish Nation” theory, he contends that although he was born the United States, he is not a United States citizen subject to its laws. Plaintiff contends that the state court lacks jurisdiction over him because of his “status” as a Moorish National.
Bey v. SOUTH CAROLINA BERKELEY 9th JUDICIAL COURT, Dist. Court, D. South Carolina 2018
Plaintiff’s first amended complaint consist largely of rambling and conclusory allegations that are difficult to follow. See generally ECF No. 16. Plaintiff refers to himself as a “Moorish National, Consul, Diplomat, Natural Citizen, Moorish Science Temple of America, Moorish Devine and National Movement of the world, [and] Aboriginal Indigenous Moorish American.” Id. at 5. The amended complaint references the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Morocco and the United States and cites extensively to caselaw that is largely irrelevant to plaintiff’s underlying dispute with defendants; i.e. a denial of an insurance claim. Plaintiff also attached to the complaint what appears to be a page from the Moorish Koran. Id. at 16. In a section with the heading “The Unconstitutional 14th Amendment” plaintiff attempts to tie his reference to Moors as somehow establishing diversity of citizenship, id. at 6, which as addressed below is lacking here.
EL v. Crail, Dist. Court, ED California 2019
To be clear, any claims or arguments raised by Plaintiffs which arise from alleged membership in a “Moorish Nation” organization, or which rely on documents or arguments based on doctrines from such an organization, are frivolous and cannot support an action in this Court. See Bey v. Hillside Twp. Municipal Court, 2012 WL 714575 at *6 (D.N.J. March 5, 2012)(describing the Moorish American Nation as an imaginary creation, and finding that “[a]ny claims or arguments raised by plaintiff which are based on his membership in the Moorish American Nation are [by definition] frivolous.”).
Robinson v. PINTEZ, Dist. Court, ND West Virginia 2019
Having carefully reviewed and liberally construed the complaint, the Court determines that it is frivolous because plaintiff’s claims are based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 (a complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory). Plaintiff’s purported status as a Moorish National does not make him immune from Missouri law. The United States does not recognize the Moorish Nation as a sovereign state, see Benton-El v. Odom, 2007 WL 1812615 *6 (M.D. Ga. June 19, 2007), Khattab El v. United States Justice Dept., 1988 WL 5117 *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1988), and plaintiff cannot unilaterally bestow sovereign immunity upon himself. See United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984). Even those who voluntarily relinquish their citizenship are subject to, and must obey, federal, state, and local laws. See Khattab, 1988 WL 5117. T
Bey v. Missouri, Dist. Court, ED Missouri 2018
On the other hand, Petitioner has demonstrated an inability to comprehend, or refusal to accept, the Court’s previous Orders. He clearly is wedded to the idea that because he is a self-proclaimed “Moorish American,” the State of North Carolina had no jurisdiction to prosecute under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). him for murder and has no legal authority to hold him in custody based upon the judgment imposed for his first-degree murder conviction. Similar such claims have been rejected by every federal court to consider them. See e.g. Kului Bey v. State of Missouri, et al., No. 4:18-cv-1515-JCH, 2018 WL 5831251, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2018) (“Plaintiff’s purported status as a Moorish National does not make him immune from Missouri law. The United States does not recognize the Moorish Nation as a sovereign state.” (citing Benton-El v. Odom, 2007 WL 1812615 *6 (M.D. Ga. June 19, 2007), Khattab El v. United States Justice Dept., 1988 WL 5117 *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1988))); Brown-Bey v. Hooks, No. 3:18-CV-460-FDW, 2018 WL 4620617, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2018) (unpublished) (“The path of the Moorish National Movement is well-trodden. Over and over again, courts have rejected arguments such as Plaintiff’s by individuals who claim to be a part of this movement.” (citing Hampton v. City of Durham, No. 1:10cv706, 2010 WL 3785538, at *2-3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2010) (unpublished) (collecting cases))); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761-67 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the conduct of another “sovereign citizen” and collecting cases rejecting the group’s claims as frivolous); United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1983) (rejecting jurisdictional challenge based on defendant’s argument he was a sovereign citizen).
JAMES-BEY v. North Carolina, Dist. Court, WD North Carolina 2018
Defendant continuously insisted that the North Carolina courts did not have jurisdiction over him because he was a “Moorish sovereign citizen” operating under the Moorish Tribe Nation who has “constitutional rights to enter the land.” Defendant repeatedly asserted this defense during the 28 October 2016 hearing.
[…]
We decline to invoke Rule 2 in order to reach the merits of Defendant’s argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the submission to the jury of the charge of assault upon a law enforcement agency animal. The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to the element of willfulness did not amount to plain error.
State v. Blue, NC: Court of Appeals 2019
{¶ 15} Despite appellant’s own proclamation that he was not competent for pro se representation purposes, and the furnishing of appointed counsel for trial, the following day appellant filed another pro se document proclaiming that, in relevant part, “This cause has come before The Grand Sheik and Chairman of The Moorish Science Temple of America* * * Grand Sheik has reviewed the charge and has found [appellant] in compliance * * *This verdict has to be not guilty.”
[…]Judgment affirmed.
State v. Hollowell, 2019 Ohio 2644 – Ohio: Court of Appeals, 6th Appellate Dist. 2019
For example, at the hearing, plaintiff continued to maintain that he is not Michael D. Ingram, but that he is the natural person who obtained the loan in question. This assertion is incoherent. The loan clearly lists Michael D. Ingram as borrower. (ECF No. 6 at 5-6.) Furthermore, notwithstanding plaintiff’s claims that he is not affiliated with any “sovereign citizen” group, he seems to assert— without legal justification—that the laws of the United States apply differently to him as an Aboriginal Indigenous Moorish American National. Plaintiff’s oblique references to a treaty with Morocco from the eighteenth century in no way supports his claims.
EL v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, Dist. Court, ED California 2019
Sovereign Citizens Exposed 